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Abstract. The paper analyses the constitutional revision process in Slovakia taking into account recent 
constitutional changes that have occurred since the financial crisis of 2008. The first part describes the forms of 
constitutional amendment procedure in theory and practice. The second part is devoted to the substantive and 
detailed examination of direct amendments taking place from 2008 onwards equipped with political situation that 
influenced each revision. Interestingly, during the period of study, all amendments but one were adopted as a 
response to the crises but all of them were connected to the political questions of a given moment. The amendments 
are completely in the hands of politicians and have become a tool to “show off” with little attention on possible 
constitutional damage. The regime of constitutional change in Slovakia is an ample illustration of political 
constitutionalism in practice.
Keywords: constitutional change in Slovakia, conceptual and procedural framework of amendment procedure, 
political constitutionalism, constitutional politics
‘Change is the constant in life.’
Heraclitus
1. INTRODUCTION
Change is a common and very natural element in everyday lives and Heraclitus stated that 
change is intertwined with life itself. It seems that change has been part of human existence 
since the beginning as it brings development and allows evolution and without change, 
there is stagnation and no progress. Constitutions, whether conceived as the highest positive 
legal norm of a given legal order (H. Kelsen) or social practice (Hart’s Rule of Recognition), 
are no exception and subject to change.
Changes to and within constitutions are both necessary and inevitable. Changes are 
necessary as otherwise there is an inherent risk that social reality might escape from the 
realm of constitution. Consequently, a constitution might not be able to regulate reality with 
social practice and become a meaningless piece of paper. Changes are also inevitable as 
they help to reflect evolution, development of social practices and reality while entrench 
them into constitutional text. Change, thus, allows a balancing pace to be kept between the 
current state of affairs in a country and its highest legal norm. In this sense state and 
constitution might diffuse together.1
On the other hand, the basic function of any constitution is to secure tranquility and 
prevent the status quo from change.2 Constitutions bring stability and allow progress 
through a long-lasting settlement of powers (the principle of separation of powers) as well 
      * Associate professor, Comenius University in Bratislava, Faculty of Law, Department of 
Constitutional Law, tomas.lalik@flaw.uniba.sk. This paper was written by the support of VEGA 
project No. 1/0777/15 ‘Výzvy a perspektívy vývoja ústavného práva Slovenskej republiky v procese 
európskej integrácie a globalizácie.’
1 For Carl Schmitt such state of affairs represents an absolute concept of constitution. See 
Schmitt (2008) 60. 
2 Some authors even suggest that constitution serves as a substitution to civil war. See Zupančič 
(2008) 21 et seq.
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as a compromise of values and other major issues within a society mainly human rights 
protection. This stability is usually attained either after a possibly violent revolution or 
gradual evolution.3 Constitutions are the evidence of fighting the change and conserving the 
past (and present) as long as possible. In this sense, American constitutional tradition 
influences a perception that constitutions should not be adopted only for a couple of years, 
but rather decades if not centuries.4 Finally, written constitutions detest change what is 
further evidenced on provisions making possible changes to and within constitutions more 
difficult. Some constitutions even prohibit a formal change through unamendable provisions 
(eternal clauses). Drafters and other constitutional actors including scholars are well aware 
of these facts.
From this perspective, a change to status quo is a possible threat to social peace 
established by a constitution. The following tension arises as although constitutional 
changes are necessary and inevitable, the very concept of the constitution serves as a 
counter fact to such necessity as one of its main function is to prevent change. Therefore 
when analyzing constitutional changes, the tension between stability and certainty and 
possible change or evolution must be acknowledged and appreciated. In addition, another 
and perhaps deeper conflict within constitutional law arises between constitutionalism and 
democracy. Constitutionalism tries to tame and impose limits on democracy, through legal 
norms, principles and values found in constitution whilst democracy is willing to overcome 
these hurdles and to re-establish itself in a perpetual process of re-creation and renovation.
Despite these tensions, changes do still occur no matter how fiercely a constitution 
fights a change, imposing either almost unattainable supermajorities (e.g., Art. V of the U.S. 
Constitution), eternal clauses (e.g., Art. 79 § 3 of the German Basic Law), employing 
various constitutional players or other obstacles into play. This, of course, is not the end of 
the analyses. Relevant factors of a change involve both certain forms in which constitutional 
changes occur as well as intensity, degree, context and nature of such changes.5 While the 
former inquiry deals with questions such as which institution is (can be) empowered and 
according to which procedures to amend a constitution the latter puts emphasis on more 
substantive questions. So there exists at least formal and substantive level when discussing 
constitutional change.
Also every process of a constitutional change involves both politics and law. Not only 
does politics transform into a fundamental legal regulation of a nation but also law 
influences politics at the beginning of the whole process by giving incentives. At the same 
time, law lays down obstacles in bringing changes into life. In the following sections of the 
paper, the formal and substantive process of constitutional change will be described as well 
the legal and political dimensions of constitutional changes with regards to Slovakia.6
The first part is an introduction allowing a foreign reader to form a picture about the 
formal issues of the constitutional change process within the Slovak constitutional law in 
3 For a profound analyses of these two avenues of constitutional development see Möllers 
(2006) 171–75. 
4 ‘A constitution, by contrast, is drafted with an eye to the future.’ See Hunter v. Southam Inc., 
(1984) 2 S.C.R. 145 at 155. Some scholars argue that the longer of life-span of a constitution, the 
better. For this inquiry see Elkins, Ginsberg and Melton (2009). 
5 E.g., Carlos Bernal distinguishes among seven different categories of constitutional change. 
See Bernal (2014) 493–95.
6 There are more than these issues of constitutional amendment procedure both in theory and in 
practice. However, some limitations are necessary given the scope of the paper.
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both theory and practice. Politics dominates the process with the leading role of political 
forces in the Slovak Parliament (‘National Council’). The second part of the paper is 
devoted to more substantive analyses of constitutional changes that occurred between 
2008–2016. This period was not accidentally chosen, but to show how this agenda has 
changed after the financial and security crisis that hit the EU and its member states, 
including Slovakia. The main point of interest will be to offer an in-depth analysis of 
amendments and a try to place them into a larger political and legal picture. The final part is 
a summary of the analysis.
2. CONCEPTUAL AND PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORKS  
FOR CHANGING THE CONSTITUTION IN SLOVAKIA
Historical Background
The Slovak Republic is a successor state after the peaceful dissolution of former Czecho-
Slovakia in 1993. The Slovak Constitution was adopted on September 1, 1992 and it has 
endorsed a constitutional tradition with a form and practice of constitutional amendment 
procedure that was prevalent in various state forms in Czechoslovakia from 1920 to 1992. 
According to this legal and cultural tradition, parliament is the sole institution empowered 
to adopt and change the constitution. The agenda of constitutional amendment is vested to 
the political institution and therefore politics played a key role. This legacy is also visible in 
the current theory and practice of constitutional change regime in Slovakia.
The first constitution that regulated the process of constitutional change was adopted in 
the aftermath of the First World War when the Czechoslovak state was first established. The 
Constitution (No. 121/1920 Coll. of Laws) gave power to both chambers of Parliament and 
for the amendment to become effective it required consent of 3/5 majority of all MPs. 
Consequently, the Constitution from 9th May 1948, already securing some principles of 
Victorious February Communist Revolution, followed a similar model when only both 
chambers of parliament could legally amend the constitution providing 3/5 of majority in 
each house. The Constitution of 1960 (No. 100/1960 Coll. of Laws), with fully implemented 
communists ideology, empowered the National Assembly to enact and revise the constitution 
by 3/5 of its majority but also to perform constitutional review and thus could declare statute 
of the Slovak National Assembly and other by-laws unconstitutional (Art. 41). Article 111 
of the Constitution provided that the Constitution could be amended only by constitutional 
statute and since then, constitutional scholarship and practice has developed the tradition 
that only a parliament can change a constitution by adopting a constitutional statute.
The structure of the state underwent a profound change in 1968 when the constitutional 
statute (No. 143/1968 Coll. of Laws) came into force. The process of constitutional change 
remained intact although Czechoslovakia had become a federation. Again, the newly 
established Federal Assembly gained the power for revision and enactment of a new 
constitution as well as constitutional statutes. The Article 41 determined that these legal 
norms had to be accepted by 3/5 majority of all members in each house of the Federal 
Assembly composed of the Peoples’ House and the Nations’ House. In the latter, the 
representatives of Slovak and Czech Nations were sitting together in parity and in order for 
a constitutional amendment to take effect, the Constitution required acceptance of 3/5 of all 
representatives of the Slovak Nation as well as 3/5 of all representatives of the Czech 
Nation.
It is clear from this brief historical analysis that constitutional tradition heavily favored 
parliament over any other institution as the primary forum for change and even adoption of 
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the constitution upon a 3/5 MPs’ majority. Therefore, it came as no surprise that constituent 
power, emerged in 1992 during the crisis of Czecho-Slovak Federation also incorporated 
such tradition into new constitution. As a result, Article 86 let. a) of the Constitution from 
1992 stipulates that the National Assembly has the power to adopt a new constitution and 
constitutional statutes and also that the National Council is the sole constituent institution in 
the Slovak Republic (Art. 72). Parliament is the only forum to amend the Constitution.
The Formal Process of Amendments of the Constitution
The process of formal constitutional amendment is done through constitutional statutes. 
Constitutional practice linked to the Czechoslovak tradition has emerged so that only 
constitutional statutes can de facto change constitution.7 De jure, constitutional text does 
not contain any derogation clause or explicit regulation of its own revision. The explicit 
standard of eventual review of constitutional laws mainly from a formal perspective is 
rather ruled out for this reason.
Few authors consider the absence of any derogation clause as the biggest threat for 
both formal and substantive level of constitutional change process.8 However, the Slovak 
Constitution contains different quorum for adoption of constitutional statutes (amendment) 
than ordinary statutes. Article 84 § 4 requires that constitutional statutes have to be accepted 
by at least 3/5 of all MPS (i.e. 90) in the National Council.9 As mentioned above, no other 
formal (and substantive) requirements are contained in the Constitution. Richard Albert 
classified such mechanism as legislative entrenchment and according to him, a law 
amending constitution must muster more than a simple majority in legislature and requires 
supermajority.10 This is the second lowest threshold on the scale of the five mapping 
constitutional amendment procedure organized from the least rigid (legislative non-
entrenchment) to the highest (indefinite constitutional entrenchment).11 It is no wonder that 
some empirical analyses show that Slovak Constitution is considered to be the least rigid 
among written constitutions of the EU member states.12
From the formal point of view as well as considering Kelsenian pyramid of legal 
norms, it is necessary to note, that constitutional statutes and the Constitution itself enjoy 
the same legal force and rank within the Slovak constitutional system.13 Although this 
assumption causes discussions among scholars,14 in practice both norms are treated in the 
same way. This approach brings about several problems to the constitutional system.
  7 See Breichová-Lapčáková (2013) 72.
  8 Balog (2014) 152; Drgonec (2002) 87.
  9 A new constitution can also be adopted by such majority of MPs. 
10 Albert (2010) 671. 
11 Albert (2010) 671–72.
12 See Balog (2014) 150.
13 This opinion has found acceptance also in the case law of the Constitutional Court in one of 
its first judgments; see in particular judgment I. ÚS 39/93 from June 2 1993 stating that between the 
Constitution and constitutional statutes is no difference in the legal force and thus they are not in 
vertical relation. Also Procházka (2011) 22.
14 Some argue that the Constitution takes precedence over a constitutional statute thanks to the 
Art. 152 § 4 stating that interpretation and application of constitutional statutes, statutes and other 
legal norms must be in conformity with the Constitution. See Drgonec (2012) 63–64; Orosz (2005) 
326–30. Others deny this approach claiming that such interpretation is isolated and systematic 
interpretation of the provision – especially form of heading (transitory and final provisions) and its 
structure – does not allow such result. For the discussion see Herc (2009) 410–26.
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The main problem concerns constitutional statutes and their relationship toward the 
Constitution. There are at least three categories of constitutional statutes.15 The first category 
of such statutes explicitly and directly changes, derogates or supplements constitutional 
text. The second category of constitutional statutes are envisaged by the Constitution itself 
e.g., Article 3 § 2 provides that the borders of the state may be changed only by a 
constitutional statute.16 The third and the most problematic category of such statutes are 
those outside the Constitution. This category neither changes the text nor is envisaged 
by the constituent power in the Constitution. The problematic aspect rests on the assumption 
that such statutes have the same legal force as the Constitution. The National Council 
enjoys almost unfettered power, not only when and to what extent it can formally and 
substantially change the constitution in a direct manner, but also it can at any time 
change the constitution indirectly by adopting a constitutional statute beyond the 
Constitution itself.
Academia has been strongly critical of such an approach, arguing that the National 
Council is only a constituted institution and as such has to act only in a manner prescribed 
by the Constitution. And since the Constitution does not provide for unlimited power 
towards constitutional statutes, parliament cannot do so.17 At the same time, the 
Constitutional Court also directly prohibited the National Council to adopt any constitutional 
statutes except those envisaged by the Constitution.18 However, the National Council has 
decided to act otherwise and currently there are at least 15 constitutional statutes beyond 
the Constitution.19 This approach taken by the National Council is continuously subject to 
heavy critique in legal doctrine and some authors express their fear that parliament is 
abusing its position vis-à-vis other constituted institutions and constitutional values20 or that 
constitutional change is by such practice degraded only to a form lacking any substantive or 
axiological analyses.21
The problem of eventual unconstitutional amendments is further exaggerated by the 
fact that there is no legal basis for constitutional review of any amendment. Article 125 of 
the Constitution anchors that the Constitutional Court is entitled to perform judicial review 
only at the level of statutes. Explicit authority to review constitutional statutes is missing in 
15 Some authors suggest that there are as many as five categories of constitutional statutes 
within Slovak constitutional order. See Breichová-Lapčáková (2013) 74.
16 Similarly, article 7 § 1, article 51 § 2, article 99 § 1 and article 102 § 3 of the Constitution.
17 E.g. Prusák (2005) 133–44; Bröstl (2008) 11 et seq.; Balog (2007) 1577–82; Breichová-
Lapčáková (2011) 190.
18 See PL. ÚS 16/95 from 24 May 1995. 
19 As a counterargument to this approach serves logical argument a majori ad minus i.e., when 
parliament can adopt new constitution it can adopt any constitutional law that deems necessary. This 
way of thinking was exposed in Procházka (2011) 41–42. For a critique see Ľalík (2015) 90–92.
20 Breichová-Lapčáková (2013) 122.
21 Balog (2014) 170. Analysis provided by Carl Schmitt resting on exclusively formal 
characteristic of a constitutional concept rings true also for constitutional change process in Slovakia. 
Firstly, the constitution (as unity) and constitutional law (as detail) are tacitly rendered equivalent and 
confused with one another. Secondly, constitution in the formal sense and constitutional laws in 
formal sense are not distinguished. Finally, constitution and constitutional law mingles together, 
although they are drawn from entirely disparate perspectives; Schmitt (2008) 68. 
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the text.22 However, silence on such power is not crucial from a comparative law perspective 
and courts abroad have not interpreted it as a negation of that authority.23
As a matter of such practice, the constitutional order of Slovakia is polylegal as outside 
of constitutional text, there are several constitutional statutes that also regulate constitutional 
content. The biggest threats of polylegality of the constitutional order are: the erosion of 
compatibility and stability of the Constitution; the tendency to add exceptions to the 
constitutional text outside the text itself and consequently emptying the content of the 
Constitution. Carl Schmitt warned against such a formal or rather formalistic approach 
claiming that an otherwise unified constitution perceived as the fundamental act of the 
constituent power may be dissolved into a series of individual constitutional laws.24
Despite the constitutional text being silent as for other avenues of formal constitutional 
amendment process, there exists another avenue which came into existence due to the case-
law of the Constitutional Court: a referendum. This mechanism is very limited due to the 
many factors that diminishes its real importance but nevertheless it is another mean for 
changing the Constitution.
In 1997, the National Council was unable to vote in the President of the Republic. 
A popular initiative supported by many politicians initiated a referendum changing 
constitutional rules about presidential elections in favor of a general election of the head of 
state. The Constitutional Court came into play as a group of MPs claimed that the President 
must not declare a referendum on changing the Constitution and they argued that the 
Constitution cannot be amended in a referendum.
In the decision PL. ÚS 31/97 from 21 May 1997, the Constitutional Court arrived at a 
conclusion that the Constitution can be amended by a referendum. The Court first 
emphasized the role of citizens as the original holders of power and fact that every 
constituted power is subject to administration of the people. Even parliament exercises 
delegated power. People themselves have nowhere in the Constitution renounced the power 
to amend the Constitution although they are also bound by the Art. 93 § 3 that exemplifies 
what cannot be subject of referendum – fundamental rights and freedoms,25 taxes, levies 
and state budget. The Court then analyzed the institute of referendum whose purpose is to 
secure the people concurrence in the exercise of state power. Referendums unlike plebiscites 
or popular initiatives have legal effects and must not be ignored by the state institutions. 
Several problems arise with this approach.
22 Some scholars find such power in general provision of Art. 124 stating that: ‘The 
Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic is an independent judicial body charged with the 
protection of constitutionality.’ See Balog (2014) 175–77; Drgonec (2015) 1320–27; Ľalík (2015) 
92–97. Others refuse such interpretation claiming that it violates formal aspect of rule of law (principle 
of legality) providing that any power of the State institution has to have legal basis, otherwise it acts 
ultra vires. For this approach see Procházka (2011) 39; Lipšic (1997) 30. 
23 For a comparative analyses of various jurisdictions see Barak (2011) 332.
24 For theoretical, normative, logical and other analysis of distinctions between a constitution 
and constitutional laws see Schmitt (2008) 67–88.
25 Regarding fundamental rights and freedoms, the Constitutional Court adopted rather generous 
approach when referendum involves human rights questions. In recent decision PL. ÚS 24/2014 from 
28 October 2014 it found that referendum may take place when standard of protection is increased or 
confirmed. So only if standard of human rights protection will be decreased, referendum must not be 
held. For an analyses see Zelenajová (2015) 160–66. 
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The first and main problem stemming from such approach is rather theoretical and 
concerns the wording of the Art. 98 § 2 of the Constitution. It requires that all proposals 
adopted in referendums must be promulgated by the National Council in the same way as it 
promulgates laws. The Constitutional Court interpreted the binding effect of a referendum 
in a way that the National Council is obliged to secure legal effects of referendum. 
Parliament serves as an intermediary of the people, so even in a referendum, the people 
need a proxy in securing their will. This is a clear renunciation on the popular sovereignty 
when the delegated power is condition sine qua non for the delegating power in such 
extraordinary event. Ironically, the parliament provides a mouth for the holder of original 
power who remains speechless even though it had just talked. Taking the argument further, 
the constitutional mechanism in the Art. 98 § 2 effectively blurs the will of the people and 
their representatives. The whole idea of a referendum as a separate avenue or concurrent 
exercise of state power is lost and non-existent.
The second problem is represented by the concern of enforceability of proposals 
adopted in a referendum. According to the Art. 73 § 2 of the Constitution, MPs enjoy free 
mandate. Although it can be argued that the peoples’ will prevails in a conflict between the 
will of the people and the will of their MPs,26 the Constitution does not prescribe any 
sanctions nor limits for MPs not respecting the will of the people. Put differently, there is 
no mechanism of how MPs could be forced to implement proposals from a referendum. 
And this mechanism cannot be created by the Constitutional Court itself.27 Perhaps it is not 
ultimately correct to assume such divergence regularly may occur due to political 
consequences in ever-approaching elections, still such a scenario remains a hypothetical 
possibility that decreases the importance of referendums in the constitutional system.
The third issue refers to a question of the direct effect of proposals adopted in 
referendums. The problem lies in the formal aspect and nature of a question put forward in 
a referendum. De lege lata questions in referendums must be formulated allowing a yes or 
no answer. Moreover, they must not be mutually conditioned.28 To attract voters questions 
are simplified to a meaningful and attractive form. According to the legal regulation, an 
explanation can be a part of the question if the question is complex.
Current Elections code as well as the former statute on the conduct of referendum have 
not addressed whether a wording of a constitutional amendment can be a part of ballot 
questions. Unfortunately, the Constitutional Court, in its judgment, negatively interpreted 
such possibility. However, it could have found otherwise and the legislative silence 
interpreted more generously towards the original holder of power. The wording of an 
amendment cannot be subject to a referendum directly. Now, in order for the referendum to 
regain its effect it is necessary to change the Elections Code and to permit the wording of 
an amendment as a part of ballot questions or the explanation. This does not seem a 
probability due to the missing political will.29 By then constitutional amendments cannot be 
included neither in the question nor in the explanation to a ballot question. Only a general 
question regarding an amendement the constitution can be put a referendum.
26 As envisaged by Jean Jacques Rousseau (1947) 83.
27 A referendum about accession to the EU took place on May 17, 2003 to allow citizens to 
decide. Notwithstanding, it was the only valid referendum in the Slovak history (the turnout 52,15% 
of eligible voters with acceptance of 92,46%), still 10 MPs and representatives of the Communist 
Party voted against the approval of Treaty on joining the EU (print No. 261, voting No. 8).
28 § 202 (3) of the Elections Code; Law No. 180/2014 Coll. of Laws. 
29 On July 1, 2014 the Elections Code came into force replacing statue No. 564/1992 Coll. of 
Laws on the conduct of referendum but have not changed anything in this regard.
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The main issue remains with questions that bring fundamental or considerable changes 
into the legal system. As stated earlier, for obvious reasons, ballot questions are formulated 
in ordinary language and simple fashion – to be understood, to raise awareness and to grasp 
attention. Questions perceived to be easy may become a complex issue for implementation. 
An example could be the question ‘Are you in favor of enacting a new constitution?’ 
While some crucial features of a new constitution might be stated in order to explain this 
question, the full-fledged new constitution as a complete legal document cannot form a part 
of the explanation. It is therefore not clear what the new constitution will look like and 
what kind of consequences will flow from valid a referendum. The problem is two-fold. 
Firstly, this situation undermines certainty of both (i) people participating on referendum 
and expressing their will and (ii) MPs who even acting bona fide and ready to enforce the 
referendum with sincere concerns may not know what course of action to take in order to 
satisfy the will of their master. Secondly, complex questions requiring further in-depth 
actions by the National Council (and eventually other institutions) broaden discretion of 
MPs because a different course of action might be taken to implement the will of people. 
This also means less actual influence of the peoples’ will in the final product and eventually 
a negation of their will.
However, not every question put forward in referendum raises similar concerns. For 
example a question ‘Are you in favor of decreasing the number of MPs to 100?’ does not 
cause similar difficulties although it is not without discretion on the part of MPs at least 
from a temporal perspective (whether to implement such will hic et nunc? or only for the 
next elections? etc.). Consequently, effectivity of a referendum depends not on the ballot 
questions but rather on the complexity of issues that stand behind them. The more 
complicated the issue, the more discretion and uncertainty on the part of the National 
Council and less influence on the part of the people. With particular questions, enforceability 
of a valid referendum might diminish to minimum. People cannot control the course of 
action taken after successful referendum while MPs might be unsure as well.
The result is that people speaking through referendum do not only need a proxy that is 
paradoxically created by them but oddly enough such proxy is a veto player in respect of 
their will. Even if the National Council is willing to accept the will of the people, it is still 
not clear how such will should be transformed into a legal world. The situation is 
exacerbated when questions require a detailed normative act or even the series of normative 
acts. Consequently, the legal effects of referendums oscillate somewhere between minimal 
and illusive. The same is true for the possibility of changing the Constitution in referendums. 
Consequently, the National Council remains the primary and the only forum for the 
constitutional amendment process.
To assess the amendment process as completely without any substantive limits would 
be a mistake. The Constitution in general provisions provides for some indirect substantive 
limitations on the power of the National Council to amend the Constitution. The first is found 
in the Article 12 § 1 that prohibits inter alia abolition of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Wording of the article is unambiguous and precise and certainly establishes legal limits to 
the unfettered power of the National Council. Beside the Constitution itself, the Constitutional 
Court seems to develop its own understanding of the nature and intensity of the change.
Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments
The Constitutional Court was confronted with serious violations of the principle of 
separation of powers shortly after independence and during the period of upheaval in the 
1990s. These violations were caused by the process of privatization when various state 
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entities and property in general were transferred onto private individuals and entities alike. 
In one of its seminal judgments, while declaring unconstitutional a statute that abrogated 
governmental regulations enabling the process of privatization and declared all contracts 
concluded upon therein as null and void, held that the Slovak Constitution contains 
principles that are free from change as they have constitutive meaning for Slovakia. At the 
same time, it added that the National Council is also bound by such principles (separation 
of powers in this case).30
However, the Court has never been confronted with an application directly challenging 
the constitutionality of a constitutional statute except of one rare case. There was no 
political will to form a new coalition following the break-down of Iveta Radičová’s 
government initiated by a non-successful vote of confidence intertwined with voting in 
favor of European System of Financial Supervising in 2011. The formal procedure to 
dissolve the National Council is rather restrictive and thus the practice of adopting an ad 
hoc constitutional statute limiting the term of office of an incumbent parliament emerged. 
This case was no exception and in order to solve the political crises, constitutional law No. 
330/2011 Coll. of Laws was adopted effectively suspending for this one occasion the 
otherwise generally applicable constitutional norm stating that MPs are elected for a period 
of 4 years.31
An applicant challenged such constitutional law claiming that it violates his subjective 
right to participate on the administration of public affairs and his legal certainty as he voted 
for candidates knowing that they are elected for 4 years period. He also relied on more 
general arguments that normative acts must not be individual and at the same time claimed 
that the constitutional statute is retroactive.
The Constitutional Court rejected the application on formal grounds. However, in its 
reasoning offered a standard that might give both hope and predict the future of how the 
Constitutional Court may handle similar applications challenging constitutional statutes. 
After commenting extensively on comparative constitutional law in regard to the 
constitutionality of constitutional laws, unusual fact when a complaint is rejected on formal 
grounds, it went on to apply the so-called Plaumann test as applicable by the ECJ.32 In the 
decision the Court assessed whether the applicant was (i) directly and (ii) individually 
affected by the act notwithstanding its declared form. For the ECJ, it is necessary that 
‘persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may only claim to be individually 
concerned if that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to 
them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons 
and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the 
person addressed.’33 The Slovak Constitutional Court applied the test and concluded that 
the applicant’s position was very far away from being directly and individually affected by 
the constitutional law in question in order to permit any such considerations.34 However, 
the test might serve as the eventual future standard of review of constitutional laws.
30 See judgment PL. ÚS 16/95, 24 May 1995.
31 It remains a secret why 3/5 of the majority in parliament when deems rules set out in the 
constitution as too rigid-to-get-along do not change them and rather adopts individual constitutional 
statutes.
32 Such test was suggested by Procházka (2011) 43–47.
33 See Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co v Commission [1963] ECR 95.
34 See decision II. ÚS 153/2013 from 28 February 2013.
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It is quite clear that when such a standard is to be employed, it will only be in cases of 
constitutional laws that both directly and individually affects a person. Consequently, such 
protection will be rather given at the level of subjective constitutional law with the human 
rights at its peak. On the contrary, objective constitutional law represented by the principle 
of separation of power will most likely be omitted from the protection by such standard. 
It remains to be seen if such standards will ever become applicable taking into account the 
rather passive attitude of the Court towards political branches of the government. After this 
brief introduction, attention now switches to recent constitutional amendments that occurred 
since 2008.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN SLOVAKIA (2008–2016)
The biggest financial and economic crisis of current times started in the second half of 2007 
and reached its peak in 2008. Several banks and private financial institutions either 
collapsed or went into insolvency. The whole banking systems of many countries broke 
down e.g., Ireland, Portugal, and Greece and the situation required interventions from 
governments with the strong support on the part of the EU institutions (mainly the ECB) 
and other international organizations (World Bank, International Monetary Fund). 
Eventually, they succeeded in saving banks and countries from complete collapse at the 
costs of higher unemployment, cuts in social benefits and increasing national debts. 
Implications of the crisis are still to be felt for decades to come. Naturally, Slovakia was 
also hit by these events.
The first effects of the crisis started to influence the Slovak economy in late 2008. 
National economy had begun to stagnate after many successful years when the GDP had 
been gradually rising in decent numbers. Domestic economic activity decreased and the 
industrial sector, heavily dependent on exports, significantly declined by 15 percent. These 
facts led to higher unemployment and less security among employed persons. In the two 
following years (2009–2010) unemployment reached 14 percent. It took another three years 
for the economy to partially recover, when national GDP and employment returned to their 
pre-crisis values.
The government responded by various means in order to fight the negative effects of 
the crisis. In late 2008, the cabinet adopted 27 and 38 different measures respectively 
affirmed by the National Council. They focused on various policies including monetary, 
fiscal, budgetary, employment, taxes and levies, pricing and salaries, aimed at improving 
employment rates, helping to stimulate the national economy and providing a safety net for 
those who found themselves jobless. However, these actions occurred only at the statutory 
level while the Constitution itself remained untouched.
In respect of the financial crisis, the National Council adopted important constitutional 
statute standing beyond the Constitution under the No. 493/2011 Coll. of Laws on budgetary 
responsibility (8 December 2011). This statute sets forth many significant mechanisms 
when the deficit of the national debt would reach above 40 percent and lower than 50 
percent of national GDP. However, the full scale effect of these mechanisms can be used 
only from 2028 and until then, a long transitory period with the less strict figures remains in 
force. The statute also created the Board for Budgetary Responsibility as an independent 
institution for monitoring and evaluating economic development and rules for budgetary 
responsibility.
At the later stage of a given period, security issues has come to spotlight due to various 
terrorist attacks in different European cities, most notably the tragic events in Paris. This 
fact led to the adoption of the last constitutional amendment in the analyses covered below.
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Confiscation of illegally obtained property
During the implications of crisis, the life of the Constitution sensu stricto remained intact. 
The first direct constitutional change after the crisis took place in 2010 and had nothing to 
do directly with the crisis. Rather, it demonstrates a typical example of the nature, degree 
and context of constitutional amendments. The National Council passed a constitutional 
statute No. 100/2010 Coll. of Laws adding another provision to Art. 20 that guarantees right 
to property: ‘Other encroachments on the right to property are allowed only in regards of 
unlawfully obtained property or illegal income and such measures are necessary in a 
democratic society for national security, protection of public order, morals or the rights and 
freedoms of others. A statute enacts conditions.’
This constitutional change represents attempts lasting several years by different 
governments to penalize people who obtained their property in illegal way or their standard 
of living does not correspond to their ‘officially’ obtained wealth. What needs to be 
emphasized, this expropriation is to be conducted outside the criminal law. To put events in 
larger picture, the national economy underwent a profound revolution in the 90s after 
gaining independence, during which state enterprises were bought by the newly established 
companies. Politics, of course, played a major role and many of the states’ enterprises built 
by generations of Slovaks were turned over to private hands overnight or left deliberately 
go bankrupt. New owners were directly or indirectly connected to political elites of that 
time and these people earned fortunes. Also mafia-style people, who in communist times 
almost did not exist, emerged controlling various industries and earning incredible sums of 
money.
Initial efforts to legally confiscate illegally obtained property outside criminal law 
guarantees began in the early 2000s and were finalized by the statute No. 335/2004 Coll. of 
Laws on proving origin of property. However, the response from government was clearly 
disproportional to the pursued aim. Numerous ‘pearls’ appeared among the statutes’ various 
provisions such as presumption of guilt, the obligation of an accused person to cooperate 
with an on-going investigation, forfeiture of property when a person was unable to 
demonstrate the origin of a property and full retroactivity of the statute. It was no wonder 
that such statute as a whole was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in its 
judgment PL. ÚS 29/05 (September 3, 2008) as it violated many principles of rule of law as 
well as the right to property. However, such a judgment did not discourage the Slovak 
political elites in their search for a constitutional solution.
The current version of constitutional statute served two aims. Firstly, it should revive 
political and general discussion aiming at popularity gain before incoming elections that 
took place later in 2010. The purpose was to demonstrate to voters how politicians see and 
care about the problem. The second aim was declared in the explanatory statement of the 
statute. In particular, the amendment is the framework of a legal basis for another statute 
that will enable the confiscation of illegally obtained property. The latter was accomplished 
by the statute No. 101/2010 Coll. of Laws that is again very constitutionally dubious 
because it stipulates excessive powers of the Financial Police, obligation of an accused to 
cooperate with the prosecutor, loss of property as a sanction, full retroactivity and 
presumption of guilt (if one cannot prove origin of property, the property forfeits).35 To the 
35 It is necessary to note, that regardless of legal qualification of statute, criminal law guarantees 
are applicable because of the nature of imposed sanctions. Loss of property is clearly a criminal 
sanction in substantive sense in the case-law of the ECtHR; for the approach of the ECtHR see e.g. 
Milenković v Serbia App. No. 50124/13 (ECtHR 1 March 2016) § 33 and cited case-law.
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best of all knowledge, the statute has never been used and the first aim was not also reached 
as the ruling coalition lost general elections in 2010.
Such changes brought about by the constitutional statute has been meaningless from 
the legal points of view as well. Firstly, one of the general principles of law is that illegal 
acts do not enjoy protection. Secondly, the strict test of proportionality introduced by the 
statute is applicable always when personal and political rights are at stake regardless of its 
explicit formulation. Applicability of the test in the Slovak context flow from Art. 13 of the 
Constitution and at the same time from supranational law including practice of supranational 
courts.
Nevertheless, the topic of confiscation of unlawfully obtained property is far from 
over. Even today, it continues to be a hot issue in the politics and a political ever-green.36 
Therefore every political party wishing to enter the National Council at least tacitly supports 
similar regulations.37 Law on confiscation of unlawfully obtained property is a must when 
you plan to seriously run in parliamentary elections. So another legislative attempt on 
statutory or even at the constitutional level is expected to arrive sooner or later.
Heading towards neopresidentialism?
The following constitutional change occurred during the political crisis after the down-fall 
of Iveta Radičová’s government following the parliamentary vote of no-confidence in 2011. 
There was no chance to form a new government due to the allocation of political forces in 
the parliament. To solve the crises, political elites adopted an ad-hoc constitutional statute 
for premature general elections (No. 330/2011 Coll. of Laws). However, the question of 
what to do with the incumbent government until the new one would be formed remained to 
be determined. The Constitution in the Article 115 § 1 provides that the president recalls the 
government if the National Council passes a vote of no-confidence, or if the parliament turns 
down the government’s request to pass a vote of confidence. Para 2 of the same article 
states that if the president accepts the government’s resignation, he will entrust it with the 
execution of its duties until a new government is appointed.
Political leaders as well as the president were of the opinion that these provisions do 
not allow the president to entrust the government with its powers in a case that the 
parliament passed a vote of no-confidence and when the president recalls the government. 
The main reason was that the Constitution was silent on this point, lacked explicit guidelines 
and the state institutions can act only when they have such explicit power.38 Such a situation 
could be overcome by either (i) using analogia legis to interpret Art. 115 § 2 as to also 
include the situation when the parliament expresses no confidence in the government taking 
into account that both forms of government’s termination of office (no confidence and 
resignation) are substantially equal or (ii) using systematic interpretation of Art. 115 § 2 in 
a way as to include the situation described in § 1 of the same article. However, political 
36 See the recent statement of one of the current opposition leaders Igor Matovič, who stated in 
a regional newspaper towards current coalition leaders: ‘A day will come when we confiscate stolen 
property from you and from the people you hide.’ For a complete summary of his statements towards 
confiscation see Pravda daily (2016) ) <http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/391254-politicke-
vyhrazky-na-lahku-vahu/ > accessed on 25 May 2016.
37 See last bill proposed by parliamentary political party OĽaNO that was turned down in the 
National Council on May 24. 2016, print No. 79.
38 See also explanatory statement of the constitutional law No. 356/2011 Coll. of Laws.
129TRACING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN SLOVAKIA BETWEEN 2008–2016
elites chose otherwise and decided to add a new provision in the form of constitutional 
amendment No. 356/2011 Coll. of Laws. The content of the amendment will now be briefly 
discussed.
Such provision creates a unique mechanism of state of affairs between the president 
and the government in the Slovak constitutional system in respect of three categories of 
governmental powers. After a vote of no-confidence in the parliament, the president recalls 
government and entrusts it with only certain powers that are exhaustively specified in new 
provisions until the new government is formed. Realization of some other explicitly stated 
powers is dependent on prior consent of the president in every single case. A third category 
of governmental powers simply cannot be realized at all.
Such regulation would not be a surprise if Slovakia was not a parliamentary republic 
with only a symbolic head of state with limited accountability and counter-signature of his 
many acts by the government. The president who needs for his many acts countersignatures 
by the government is now in the position that his signature is the condition for governmental 
action. The amendment strengthens the position of president vis-à-vis the role of parliament 
whose role has been decreased in that the recalled government is rather accountable to the 
president than to the parliament. The amendment introduced a feature of neo-presidentialism 
into Slovak constitutional order because the president now controls to some extent actions 
of the government.
It is hard not to notice many flaws inherent in this amendment. The first is the question 
of accountability. Who is responsible for acts of the government after the counter-signature 
by president? It is certainly not the government, but the accountability of the president is 
also very limited.39 Secondly, the government is quite limited in its actions and some actions 
cannot perform at all. What would happen when the government entrusted by the president 
had to act in this way few months or even years? Thirdly, it is not clear what to do when the 
government has to act as one of the substitutes for the president when his office is vacant or 
the president is unable to perform his duties. Fourthly, what is the status of individual 
members of government? Can they be recalled? One can get an expression that this 
amendment has brought more problems and questions than it had resolved.40 No surprise 
when you learn that this provision was prepared in record time: four hours.
The Abolishment of Criminal Immunity of MPs and Judges of the Constitutional 
Court
Another constitutional change marked the 20th anniversary of the enactment of Constitution. 
The amendment No. 232/2012 Coll. of Laws abolished obligatory consent of the National 
Council with criminal prosecution of MPs and also mandatory consent with criminal 
proceeding of constitutional court judges by the Constitutional Court. Its ultimate aim was 
to create equality between MPs, Constitutional Court judges and citizens. The amendment 
resulted in MPs losing their privileged position in terms of criminal prosecution and consent 
of the National Council is no longer required.
To put events in broader perspective, the privileges of MPs in respect of criminal and 
other prosecution had been gradually weakened since 2000s. Initially, MPs enjoyed a very 
39 They can be only recalled by the ruling of the Constitutional Court for intentionally violating 
constitution or for high treason when 3/5 of MPs fill the claim. The second possibility represents 
popular referendum initiated by the proposal of the 3/5 of MPs.
40 For a detailed analyses of the amendment see Giba (2013) 169–75; Balog, Svák (2012) 
23–40.
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wide criminal immunity with Article 78 § 2 of the Constitution provided that they could not 
be criminally or disciplinary prosecuted nor taken into pre-trial detention without the 
consent of the National Council. If such consent was not given, prosecution was barred 
forever. This provision was subject to change by constitutional amendment No. 90/2001 
Coll. of Laws that abolished the provision barring prosecution forever and inserted only 
temporal obstacle providing that an MP cannot be prosecuted in case of no-consent when 
holding the office. Time-limits for such period did not apply. This amendment also 
introduced civil liability of MPs for their statements in the National Council as well as in its 
organs. However, this civil liability was later abolished by the constitutional amendment 
No. 140/2004 Coll. of Laws in order to (i) prevent MPs from being sued by political 
adversaries and (ii) to allow freer discussion in parliament.41 Later on, the constitutional 
law No. 210/2006 Coll. of Laws abolished immunity in respect of administrative sanctions 
followed by the constitutional statute No. 232/2012 Coll. of Laws.
However, it is still not possible to talk about full equality between citizens and MPs 
because the latter kept two procedural guarantees in comparison to the former. Firstly, their 
pre-trial detention is contingent on the consent of the National Council (Art. 78 § 3) and 
their apprehension and arrest is conditioned upon the consent of the Mandate and Immunity 
Committee of the National Council (Art. 78 § 4). If these consents are not given, pre-trial 
detention or apprehension must not be imposed against an MP. In my opinion, such 
regulation represents a sound compromise between full immunity and accountability 
of MPs on the one hand and certain guarantees of MPs against encroachments and perhaps 
even a misuse of authority in the executive power on the other. Slovakia is far from being a 
stable democracy with proper political culture. Political opponents from either side of 
the political spectrum can easily become primary targets and subject to criminal 
investigation.42 Politically motivated criminal prosecution, unfortunately, cannot be 
completely ruled out.
Constitutional statute No. 232/2012 Coll. of Laws had also affected the status of the 
Constitutional Courts’ judges. According to the constitutional text, the judges enjoy the 
same immunity and procedural guarantees as MPs so effectively they have become fully 
accountable in criminal law except their decisional powers. However, similar to MPs, 
taking a judge into pre-trial detention requires the consent from the Constitutional Court 
(Art. 136 § 2 in fine). Otherwise, judges of the court do not enjoy any special treatment in 
regards of criminal prosecution.
Definition of Marriage and Enhancing Judicial Accountability
Perhaps the most extensive constitutional amendment in the period was constitutional 
statute No. 161/2014 Coll. of Laws. It had touched different parts of the Constitution but its 
main focus was judicial power. The formal argument for the National Council’s intervention 
41 See explanatory statement to the constitutional statute No. 140/2004 Coll. of Laws; print 
No. 517.
42 See a press conference during election campaign in February 2016 where the Prime Minister 
Robert Fico publicly accused and showed evidence against the prominent opposition figure Igor 
Matovič that the committed tax frauds in his former company in amount of 4 million euro. 
Investigation into suspicious activities of Mr. Matovič started immediately; Aktuality (2016) <http://
www.aktuality.sk/clanok/313185/fico-obvinil-matovica-vraj-prepral-122-milionov-cez-bieleho-
kona/> accessed 27 May 2016.
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was low public confidence in the judiciary43 and attempts to increase judicial accountability. 
The constitutional reform drew on many various aspects. Timing was also decisive as the 
amendment took place before the presidential elections where one of the candidates was 
also the incumbent Prime Minister Robert Fico.
Firstly, it abolished the immunity of judges of general courts, as their criminal 
prosecution required the consent of the Constitutional Court. Such privilege has been 
abandoned by the amendment but judges still cannot be held criminally liable for their 
decision even after the termination of their function (Art. 148 § 4). However, judges 
cannot be taken into pre-trial detention without the consent of the Constitutional Court (Art. 
136 § 3).
Secondly, the powers of the Judicial Council were extended for the purpose of its 
increased role or administration of justice. The Judicial Council acquired authority to issue 
an Ethical Code for the judiciary with the cooperation of justice councils.44 The existence of 
ethical principles beyond judges’ legal obligations and their stricter liability for not 
respecting these principles should increase public confidence among the population.
Further on, the former single function of the President of the Supreme Court and the 
President of Judicial Council were separated. This change was made in order to remove the 
judge Štefan Harabin who for several years held various high positions in the judiciary 
including the presidency at the Supreme Court and in the Judicial Council. For many, he 
represented the judiciary itself. Unfortunately, he is known for many incidents such as libel 
lawsuits against various media, degrading and removing opponents within the judiciary 
through disciplinary proceedings to other courts or different judicial offices at a court. Many 
perceived him as allegory to justice and the main reason for a lack of public confidence in 
the judiciary. Although I think that Mr. Harabin has his share in the current state of judiciary, 
he is not the reason for the state, but rather its consequence. The problems of the judiciary 
are much deeper and structural – a decorative change at the head does not solve the problem. 
This is also confirmed by the fact that the judiciary has been run by different people for two 
years but no positive changes were achieved yet and nothing suggests that anything is in 
sight.
The President of the Judicial Council is now one of the highest state officials in terms 
of material benefits unlike the rest of Judicial Council members who hold only honorary 
offices in the council. The President of the Judicial Council also gained a power to initiate a 
proceeding before the Constitutional Court in regards of constitutionality of statutes when 
they affect the judiciary.45
The amendment introduced a new condition for the future judges as well as the 
incumbent ones. All judges must now fulfil ‘preconditions of judicial abilities’ (predpoklady 
sudcovskej spôsobilosti). The preconditions in general should help to assess judges and 
candidates from ethical, personal and social points of view. In practice, information includes 
43 According to the latest published polls by the NGO Via Iuris in October 2015 as many as 
74% of the population does not have confidence in judiciary; Via Iuris (2016) < http://www.viaiuris.
sk/aktualne/568-dovera-voci-sudom-opat-kl.html > accessed 28 May, 2016.Unfortunately, this is 
a general trend in the society towards all public institutions excluding the President.
44 Justice councils unlike the Judicial Council are autonomous entities created by judges 
themselves in every court.
45 She already availed herself of such authority and successfully challenged the statute freezing 
salaries of judges for the year 2015. The Constitutional Court declared the law in respect of judges as 
unconstitutional in the judgment PL. ÚS 27/2015 from 25 November 2015.
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the private and family life of a person, prior work experience and social contacts. It is 
thought that preconditions should serve as the means to increase public confidence of 
judiciary.
During the process of appointment, preconditions are assessed by the Judicial Council 
on the basis of information provided by the secret service and intelligence and also 
information given by a candidate. If a candidate does not fulfil the criteria, she will not 
become a judge. This condition for holding a function has retroactive effect as even 
incumbent judges have become subjects of investigation by the Judicial Council and secret 
services. When a judge stops conforming to criteria, disciplinary proceeding are instigated 
against her ending up in dismissal from the office. Judges and candidates can lodge an 
appeal against negative decisions of the Judicial Council on the Constitutional Court whose 
decision is final.
Given such exceeding encroachment especially by the executive power on judicial 
functions, no wonder that outrage among judges and other elites followed. It was the 
President of the Judicial Council that challenged respective statutes that execute 
constitutional amendment in respect of incumbent judges arguing that regulation is 
retroactive, violates the separation of powers principle, the independence of judiciary and 
legal certainty. The Constitutional Court accepted her application on 17 September 2014 in 
the decision PL. ÚS 21/2014 and until decision on the merits it suspended effects of 
challenged provisions. To this day, a decision on merits has not been adopted, thus remains 
to be seen how the Court will assess the regulation. What is certain and of particular interest, 
the Court in the judgment will have to deal also with the constitutional statute No. 141/2014 
Coll. of Laws itself because the challenged statutes only execute constitutional provisions 
and the Constitution and statutes are substantially intertwined. The question of 
constitutionality of constitutional amendments and their judicial review could be possibly 
opened and revisited.
The constitutional amendment also touched the position of the Constitutional Court. It 
violated finality of its judgments by introduction of a new provision that allows to submit 
an extraordinary remedy against its decision. The provision refers to reopening of a trial 
after a decision of an international organ of an international treaty by which Slovakia is 
bound gave rise to the obligation to revise a decision of the Constitutional Court (The Art. 
133 of the Constitution). This provision was the reaction on impossibility to re-open a 
procedure before the Constitutional Court after judgments of the ECtHR found a violation 
of the Article 6 of the ECHR. An individual case is behind the provision.
Mr. Harabin, as mentioned previously, has been controversial figure in the Slovak 
judiciary. In 2011, the Ministry of Justice decided to investigate his various cases as the 
President of the Supreme Court (e.g. handling with files, not allowing an audit at the 
Supreme Court etc.) and launched disciplinary proceedings. Under the Constitution, the 
sole institution for conducting such proceeding is the Constitutional Court. In its decision 
PL. ÚS 92/2011 it found that Mr. Harabin is guilty of some disciplinary wrongdoings. Mr. 
Harabin lodged an application to the ECtHR claiming various violations of his procedural 
rights before the Court under Article 6 § 1 of the ECHR, namely that the bench of the Court 
was not impartial. ECtHR found violation of Art. 6 § 1 of the ECHR in that very respect 
and stated: “The most appropriate form of redress in cases like the present one would be the 
reopening of the proceedings, if requested, by a tribunal complying with the requirement of 
impartiality within the meaning of Article 6.”46 However, the legal order did not allow 
46 Harabin v Slovakia App. No. 58688/11 (ECtHR, 20 November 2012) § 178.
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explicitly for reopening a procedure before the Constitutional Court. Although Mr. Harabin 
sought such reopening, the Constitutional Court refused to do so on 29 October 2013 by the 
decision PL. ÚS 6/2013. The Court split but was unable to adopt any decision because the 
Constitution in Art. 132 § 1 in fine requires that for the decision on merits in plenary issues 
the Court must adopt a decision by minimum 7 votes (out of 13), otherwise application is 
rejected.47
This fact was a huge incentive for a delegated constituent power to pass an amendment 
overcoming such an impasse and to enable the reopening of a procedure before the 
Constitutional Court in future cases when violation of the Convention was found. Details of 
the constitutional amendment are formulated in § 75 of the Constitutional Court Act No. 
38/1993 Coll. of Laws. So far the Court has adopted a practice that firstly it decides about 
the formal conditions of an application for the reopening procedure and only later renders a 
decision whether to allow a trial de novo.48 The case record is not long enough to discern 
far-reaching conclusions but for now it seems that the Constitutional Court adopted a 
generous approach towards interpretation of the obligation stemming from a decision of the 
ECtHR. Even if the ECtHR does not explicitly indicate that the re-opening would be the 
best remedy for an applicant, the Constitutional Court prefers substantive protection of 
applicants’ rights and enables re-opening also in such cases.49 However, the Court was not 
so generous towards Mr. Harabin and his new application after the constitutional amendment 
while rejected found that it already substantially analyzed his case in a prior decision (PL. 
ÚS 6/2013). This decision is res iudicata.50
Last but not the least, part of the constitutional statute No. 161/2014 Coll. of 
Laws dealt with the definition of marriage. The amendment set forth a new wording of 
the Art. 41 § 1 that the marriage is a unique union between a man and a woman. This case 
also illustrates how constitutional changes come into being by a way of political 
compromise.
The dominant political party of that period SMER-SD, which alone could create a 
government after a premature general election in 2012, had a clear majority of 83 MPs in 
the National Council. Before the presidential elections in which the prime minister ran, the 
SMER-SD decided to reform the judiciary as it had become less popular by introducing 
more accountability and also to revoke Mr. Harabin from his functions. In order to do that, 
it had to pass a constitutional amendment. As stated earlier, for passing a constitutional law 
the consent of 90 MPs is required, so at least 7 MPs had to be obtained from other political 
parties forming the opposition. The negotiations had started and within a few weeks 
conservative Christian democrats (KDH having 16 MPs) were on board to join the bill. 
47 Some judges stuck to a formalistic reading of the Constitution that explicitly did not allow 
a re-opening of the procedure and stated that decisions of the Court are final. Unlike Spanish 
Constitutional Court who in decision Barbera (No. 245/91) in similar circumstances did allow for the 
reopening of procedure after violation of the Art. 6 of the Convention in respect of a criminal 
proceeding conducted before courts of general jurisdiction. Spanish legal order was silent on this 
point and the court extensively interpreted Art 10 § 2 of the Spanish Constitution to arrive at such 
result. See Hartwig (2005) 882.
48 See decision PL. ÚS 1/2016 from 19 January 2016, § 17.
49 E.g. decision III. ÚS 650/2016 from 24 February 2016, § 11; decision III. ÚS 347/2015 from 
27 October 2015.
50 See decision PL. ÚS 1/2016 from 19 January 2016, §§ 19–21.
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Of course, their condition for the support was the precise definition of marriage that landed 
on the same constitutional amendment as the reform of judiciary. Political constitutionalism 
in full swing and evidence of how two rather unrelated issues can end up together.
Prohibition on Water Export
The following unique constitutional statute was passed on 21 October 2014 under No. 
306/2014 and unlike previously discussed issues, it dealt with ecology, environment and 
protection of the water resources in Slovakia. This amendment has supplemented the 
Constitution in two important ways. Firstly, it added a provision of declaratory nature to 
the Art. 4 stating that the Slovak republic protects and enriches its natural heritage and the 
country makes use of it effectively and gently in the benefit of the Slovak citizens and 
future generations. It has also created rather limited regime of doing business with water 
coming from Slovakia. Especially, the latter is of a particular interest.
In general, Slovakia has very large water resources.51 The government has finally 
decided to protect them on the constitutional level by inserting the provision that it is 
forbidden to transport water taken from water resources in Slovakia abroad by means of 
transportation or pipelines. This ban however does not include water for personal 
consumption, drinking water and natural mineral water packed to consumers’ packages 
within Slovakia and to provide water for humanitarian aid and in a state of emergency.52
This constitutional amendment had two purposes. At the constitutional level it executed 
the decision of the government No. 583 from 24 October 2012 aimed at more intense 
protection of water, to define water as a strategic natural resource and national interest, to 
regulate the transport of water abroad including water that is found on territories of two or 
more states and to determine a fee for license allowing transport of underground water 
abroad.53 It also prevented a Polish company in its effort to put into operation a pipeline 
from the Slovak village Legnava to Poland in order to transport water from Slovakia to 
Poland and sell it on the Polish market.
The reaction from the Polish company that had already invested a considerable sum of 
money into the pipeline and its business plan was quick. It decided to sue Slovakia on the 
basis of a bilateral treaty between Slovakia and Poland on the protection of investments for 
introducing such ban on water export claiming a loss of interest and violation of legitimate 
expectations. On the top of that, Slovakia has been subject of the investigation by the 
European Commission in the infringement procedure under the Article 258 of the TFEU. 
The fate of the provision that bans transport of water is unclear especially in respect of the 
EU law. Although Article 7 § 2 of the Constitution states that EU law takes precedence over 
statutory law only, the Constitutional Court in its decision PL. ÚS 3/09 implicitly declared 
priority of EU law even over the Constitution.54 So if the provision violates EU law its 
abolition might seem necessary.
51 According to some estimates, Slovakia has the second largest water resources in the world 
after neighbouring Austria; Aktuality (2016a) 4. Aktuality (2016a) <http://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/ 
203502/slovensko-je-druhou-krajinou-na-svete-s-najvacsou-zasobou-pitnej-vody/> accessed 27 May 
2016.
52 Further legal analyses of the amendment is discussed in Král (2016) 137–46.
53 Vláda SR (2016) Vláda SR (2016) <http://www.rokovania.sk/File.aspx/ViewDocumentHtml/
Uznesenie-12929?prefixFile=u_> accessed 27 May 2016.
54 For partial critique of this approach see Ľalík (2013) 783–815.
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Limitation on Personal Liberty
The last analysed constitutional change was officially caused by the terrorist attacks in Paris 
that took place in November 2015. The result was an adoption of the constitutional statute 
No. 427/2015 Coll. of Laws from 8 December 2015 taking effect on January 1, 2016.55 This 
statute has supplemented Article 17 § 3 that protects the right to personal liberty. In respect 
of terrorist acts, the amendment has extended the time-limit for a person to be brought 
before a judge from 48 hours to 96 hours or be released.56
As with many other constitutional statutes, politics remained victorious over rationality 
and law. Slovakia is not under direct threat of a terrorist attack like other major European 
states. It is important to note that the terrorist legislation has been used only once in real 
criminal cases since its introduction in 2001. This was a case involving a psychopathic and 
mentally ill person (and animal lover), who constructed a bomb and put it into a basket in 
front of a McDonald’s restaurant in Košice. No one was hurt during this incident and a 
person was accused but has not yet been sentenced for a terrorist act. This constitutional 
amendment, once more, was for rather populist purposes to demonstrate voters that they are 
protected from terrorists even at the constitutional level.
From a practical point of view and doing justice to international obligations of 
Slovakia, it is still necessary to interpret this provision in accordance with the Article 5 § 3 
of the Convention. It provides that everyone arrested should be promptly brought before a 
judge. The notion of promptness for conventional purposes is assessed taking into account 
relevant circumstances of a given case while the ECtHR had refused to adopt wide 
interpretation of the term. Article 5 § 3 “leaves little flexibility in interpretation, otherwise 
there would be a serious weakening of a procedural guarantee to the detriment of the 
individual and the risk of impairing the very essence of the right protected by this 
provision.”57 This approach is also applicable in the context of terrorism.58
4. CONCLUSIONS
The analyses shows that a vast range of issues have been covered by amendments in both 
objects of constitutional law; separation of powers and human rights law. In my view, at 
least three things especially in terms of rigidity of the Constitution and nature of changes 
can be stressed. The text has experienced 6 changes in the last 7 years. The Constitution is 
subject to change almost once a year (1.2 to be precise). This fact is definitely not an 
evidence of its rigidity but rather of its flexibility. A constitutional amendment is always an 
option for the National Council because gathering 90 MP is not a serious problems as 
showed in practice. Constitutional change represents a very attractive possibility for minor 
and insignificant groups of MPs or even individual MPs to have their mark on the 
55 Besides the constitutional statute in question, the National Council has amended many other 
statutes including Code of Criminal Procedure and Statute on Police Forces to strengthen the powers 
of police and further limit fundamental rights of persons accused of terrorist acts.
56 Originally, the bill contained even longer time-limit set out for 144 hours but such excessive 
time-limit was fortunately changed in the legislative process.
57 See among many authorities Kandzov v Bulgaria App. No. 68294/01 (ECtHR, 6 November 
2008) §§ 65–66.
58 See Brogan and Others v UK App. No. 11209/84 (ECtHR, 29 November 1988), § 62.
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fundamental law of the Nation.59 On the other hand, the allocation of forces in the National 
Council does not (at least for now) allow for a single party to amend the Constitution 
unilaterally. And this brings us to the second feature.
Constitutional amendments remains fully in the realm of politics and politicians. They 
control the process of change from its beginning to the very end including its timing. 
Constitutional amendments that considerably alter the system and structure of the 
Constitution (as with constitutional laws No. 356/2011 or No. 161/2014) can be passed 
within a few hours or even overnight. Involvement of the Constitutional Court or other 
mechanisms to make process more complicated or slow it down are put on hold for now. 
A constitutional amendment that would change the whole process of constitutional change 
itself is not on the horizon because MPs would eventually lose their exclusivity over the 
process.60 Perhaps the interference of the Constitutional Court seems a possibility, but no 
one knows what would happen with a decision declaring a constitutional amendment 
unconstitutional because the Slovak institutions have had a decent record of not respecting 
its judgments in less important issues.61 The court is currently 3 judges short (10 out of 13) 
because the President refused to nominate candidates put forward by the National Council.62 
The Constitutional Court is rather passive towards other branches of government as it does 
not use its power to declare statue unconstitutional very often. Average is lower than four 
cases a year.63
What is more pessimistic is the nature and context of constitutional amendments of a 
studied period. In general they represent accidental political compromises. Their content 
raises questions of conformity with the Constitution what even more undermines the unity 
of the document and damages constitutional culture among politicians and citizens. 
Ineffectiveness and unsystematic nature are major elements of amendments and the practice 
that surrounds them. Moreover, the majority of amendments were realized shortly before 
the general elections. They can be dubbed as lois spectacles in the full sense when the main 
59 An extreme example can be the second sentence of Article 4 § 1 of the Constitution inserted 
by the constitutional statute No. 306/2014 Coll. of Laws that was proposed by the single MP (Ľudovít 
Kaník).
60 It remains questionable whether other mechanisms are useful and effective in practice. E.g. in 
Greece under Article 110 of the Greek constitution constitutional revisions take place in two 
parliamentary phases, between which general elections are held. However, this intended involvement 
of the people bears little influence on amendments in practice because Greeks due to polarisation in 
society tend to vote for their party at elections irrespective of an amendment in question. See 
Contiades and Fotiadou (2016) 200–201.
61 E.g. decision not to adopt any constitutional statutes as only those envisaged by the 
Constitution itself (PL. ÚS 16/95); decision that abolished Specialised Court (PL. ÚS 17/08) when 
quite similar court is still a part of the judiciary; the obligation of the president to appoint nominations 
for constitutional court judges (PL. ÚS 45/2015 and III. ÚS 571/2014) what was not respected by the 
president and the Court is 3 judges short; decision abolishing a committee of the National Council 
that reviews decision of the National Security Office (PL. ÚS 6/04), the National Council adopted the 
same regulation as a constitutional statute in order to escape judicial review of such regulation etc.
62 For further details see Ľalík, Tomáš (2016) ‘Constitutional Court Crisis in Slovakia: Still 
Far Away from Resolution’, Blog of the International Journal of Constitutional Law and Constitution 
Making.org <http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/08/constitutional-court-crisis-in-slovakia-still-far-
away-from-resolution/> accessed 23 November 2016
63 See Ľalík (2015) 207.
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aim of the regulation is insignificant and what matters most is the propaganda and a gain in 
popularity.64 The moment of enactment demonstrates the nature of constitutional change – 
to raise popularity among voters regardless of the damage caused to the a constitutional 
system. The constitutional changes have become a show-off political document.
I do not want to end up being pessimistic. This is the political constitutionalism in 
practice and its various proponents ranging from Richard Bellamy and Grégoire Webber to 
Jeremy Waldron or Mark Tushnet would be in the constitutional paradise. But would they?
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